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CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New York: Washington Square Publish-
ing Corp., 1952. Pp. xx, 1390. $8.50.
REv EW of this stupendously compendious volume presents difficulties. I
have concluded that it must be approached on two levels. The first is as an
inclusive procedural reference book for teachers, scholars, lawyers, and reform-
ers. The second is as a teaching tool for law school instruction.
On the first level one can welcome this as a valuable contribution, present-
ing, with imagination and originality, a modem, forward-looking approach to
law administration. The inclusion of rules of criminal procedure, the stress
on judicial statistics, the materials on execution of a judgment, selection of
judges, jury service, the legal profession and its ethics, legal aid and court
organization-all these and similar sections of the book show a reaching for
the practical details of judicial administration rare in either texts or casebooks.
The culminating touch of a supplement containing the Martindale-Hubbell
Court Calendars, thus introducing the student to the judges and taking him
right into the courts of the various states, should add final reality to the at-
tempted picture. Interspersed with all this are many legal essays on a variety
of issues procedural, such as the undesirability of employing the practice courses
as a mere adjunct to substantive courses for the purpose of explaining his-
torical references and allusions. The wonder is how the busy author, among
all his manifold duties, could find time to prepare all this-a wonder which
grows with each new step of his distinguished career.' Since I am developing
this phase of the book in another review, 2 I shall not attempt to cover it more
fully here. A single caveat is necessary: the materials are selective and do not
exhaust, perhaps at times even distort, the subordinate topics discussed. But
this is a limitation inherent in any widely inclusive book of legal reference. It
does not detract excessively from the book's unique value as a professional aid
and cultural guide in the field of law administration.
When we come to the function of the book as a vehicle for modern case teach-
ing in the American law school, serious questions arise. No one can appreciate
more than I the individualistic, nay divisive, characteristics of procedure teach-
ing throughout the country. Even so, there remains a feeling that too much has
been attempted for successful accomplishment, and concern-aggravated by the
author's imposing professional stature-lest distortion appear and even dis-
trust be suggested as to some of the most basic of modern reforms.
1. See Clark, Review of VANDERBILT, MINrmUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATIox, 59 YALE L.J. 1371 (1950).
2. In 26 CoNe. B.J. No. 4 (Dec. 1952).
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In our schools the teaching of procedure has followed four major lines, with
well-nigh innumerable variations in between. The local, emphasizing the law
of a particular state, had original vogue,3 but yielded when its emphasis upon
vocational training was found inconsistent with both the aims of a national
law school and the basic essentials inherent and actually discoverable in the sub-
ject. Nevertheless it tends to return intermittently. Next the historical pro-
voked great interest because of a general law school trend in that direction at
the beginning of the century and because it fitted in well with the rest of the
curriculum and was unobtrusively popular with the teachers of other subjects.
This approach still has vogue; one might even conclude that most substantive
law teachers would consider a combination of the local and historical approaches
all that is needed in the procedural field. But this view is so effectively de-
structive of student interest and so unconducive to knowledge of the modem
courtroom that procedure teachers rebelled and sought their own place in the
curricular sun. Since the cases--as well as lawryers and judges-continually
proved not only the desirability, but the actual necessity, of some acquaintance
with both present-day law administration and the wide movement seeking its
improvement, modern procedure could not long be barred from the classroom.
But in what form was it to enter in view of the differences in approach and
over objectives and the unsettling effect of reform? The immediate answer
was, not unnaturally, the survey, ranging temporally from past darkness to
contemporary light and geographically from those areas reflecting the past to
those mirroring the future. Such courses certainly mark an advance into the
modern era, but they present a mass of undigested material which cannot help
but suffer by contrast with the material presented in substantive law courses.
Finally, there is the approach of detail-I should like to say the scicntilic ap-
proach,4 but hesitate to garb so ostentatiously the program to which I have
long been committed 3 -stressing precise and extended study of modern pro-
cedure, notably as exemplified in the federal rules. Such an approach is deemed
necessary in order that the student may understand the subject and recognize
the pitfalls which lurk to trip the unwary.
This volume is distinctly of the survey type, carried to a degree more ex-
tensive than usual, consonant with the author's unique experience in law ad-
ministration and his imaginative grasp of details. So, if it works, this should
bring freshness to the schools in a needed area of instruction. But for this
3. For the older view of distinguished authorities that only the local code should be
taught, see C. W. Pound, 1922 HANDBoo0 Ass'N Ax. L. ScHOOLS 99, 105; Tcaching Ciil
Procedure, 4 CORNELL L.Q. 143 (1919); Hough, 1922 HAxaDtox Ass',.- As. L ScHOOs
110, 112. Cf. Cr.Kx, CODE PLx ADioG 69-71 (2d ed. 1947).
4. See Chorley, Pleading-A Subject for Scientific Study, 12 Mop. L Rnv. 319 (1949).
5. See the Prefaces to CLA=r, CASES ONT MoDr2'N PLvr DING vii (1952), and tJ CLA-,,,:,
CASES ON PI. ZANG AND PRocEurin vii, ix (2d ed. 1940) (with citations at p. x to other
discussions by the writer); also Clark, Book Review, 97 U. oF PA. L. REv. 917 (1949).
See also Donnelly, Book Review, 60 YALx L.J. 377 (1951).
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puzzled or doubting Thomas, it is difficult to see how it can be made to work,
except perhaps -by an exceptional lecturer of fiery skill or of unusual inquisitorial
powers. The case method, in focusing sharply upon the dynamic and the con-
crete, puts a premium on matters having intellectual bite for the student. That
bite is available at once in torts and contracts. The student can get it in the
law of procedure, but with more difficulty, since each narrow case illustrating
a single point of pleading is rarely as interesting as the individual case of tort
or promise. But putting together cases involving differing methods of stating
a claim in negligence or upon the "common counts" in an endeavor to work
out both a philosophy and a practical course of daily court conduct can become
exciting. At least it is to the Pacific Coast lawyers who today are fighting
over it in ways that the doctrine of consideration in the law of contracts does
not stimulate.0 That intellectual attraction, necessary in the competition of
subjects in the modern law school, is likely to be lost-to the permanent im-
pairment of intelligent interest by the eventual practitioner-by long disser-
tations, in themselves unobjectionable or even admirable.
For my part I must confess that, after many years at the game, I would not
know how to teach much of this book, particularly with first-year law students
for whom it is especially designed. Thus right at the beginning there is con-
siderable monographic material-sixty-tvo pages-on such topics as the im-
portance of procedure, the unfavorable attitude of substantive law teachers,
and "The Complexity of the Organization of American Courts," together with
Dean Pound's famous essay on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice." However valuable this is for citation, it sug-
gests only a series of lectures-and one knows what a wet blanket that is.
Moreover, even though some cases then follow, they are merely illustrative of
selected topics; one must go many pages further to find materials providing
conflict or base for intellectual discussion. And these seem all too isolated.
Even such original ideas as the incorporation of cases under the rules of
criminal procedure with the civil cases really slow the discussion. Although
in theory the connection should be close, actually they present quite disparate
problems.7
Of course, this may mean only that such a book is not for me but is for
teachers more skilled in its approach. This I recognize; while I should like to
see how such a book may be employed, I do not wish to question the possi-
bility of its successful pedagogical use. But my deeper concern is aroused by
the perhaps inevitable consequence of a lopsided, even misleading, treatment
6. See the proposal by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference of an amendment to FED.
R. Civ. P. 8(a) requiring in the complaint a statement which "shall contain the facts con-
stituting the cause of action." REP. JuDIciAL CoNF. oF THE U.S. 23 (Sept. 22-24, 1952).
7. Thus the material on civil process and its service, attachment, and provisional
remedies, pp. 234-99, does not mesh with the material on arrest of an accused or search and
seizure of his person or property, pp. 299-320. Important as are the problems in each field,
those from one area do not throw direct light on those from the other.
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of many an important subject. Illustrations are many; they include such diverse
subjects as appealability of trial orders, class suits, intervention, joinder, ob-
jections to pleadings. One fears that a little of this inheres in almost every
special topic. A striking example is the admissibility in evidence of business
entries, the treatment of which is confined to the case of Palmer v. Hoff;;an
and a note and map showing the extent of adoption of the uniform or model
statute. The case quoted is of course the leading one; but thus to limit the
materials is to conceal the scholarly criticism it received and the present judicial
trend toward restoration of the statute." Except as a point of departure for a
long classroom lecture, the material is therefore inadequate to the point of in-
accuracy.
One further example must here suffice, one of particular importance as touch-
ing a basic and apparently still misunderstood issue of modem reform. I refer
to the manner of pleading in the new federal procedure and the omission there
of a definite admonition that the pleader must "state the facts constituting the
cause of action."'1 The history of the confusion in the code emphasis upon
pleading "facts"; the criticism of scholars; and the Advisory Committee's at-
tempt to strike a sane middle course, adapting, for negligence and the common
counts, the common-law precedents from trespass on the caseI1 and assumpsit,
while abjuring the more technical of the precedents from New York and else-
where ---all make an interesting study which can be presented substantially
from case material. This solution is not, however, achieved by a single rule,
8. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See discussion of the case in Morgan, The Law of E idcnce,
1941-1945, 59 HAnv. L. REv. 481, 565-7 (1946) ; Note by J.M.M., 56 id. 45S (1942) ; Note,
54 YALE L.J. 868 (1945).
9. See, e.g., Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F2d 122, 130 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951) ; Korte v. New York, N.H1 & H.R.R., 191 F.2d S6
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 863 (1951), noted in a number of law rediews, including
37 Copan.LL L.Q. 290 (1952) and 5 VAND. L. REv. 651 (1952). See also citations in note 8
spra.
10. For recent revival of the issue, see note 6 stpra.
11. Federal Form 9, "Complaint for Negligence," comes straight from the commun law,
Williams v. Holland, 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (C.P. 1833), by way of the Masn-
chusetts statute, MAss. Gnx. LAws c. 231, § 147, p. 2&92 (1932). See Reichwein v. United
Electric Rys., 68 RI. 365, 27 A.2d 845 (1942), quoting the declaration in 2 Cmi, P.xLO-
ING 574 (16th Am. ed.). So Federal Forms 4-8 are in substance the common counts which
were upheld in code pleading. Cook, "Facts" and "Statenwut. of Fact," 4 U. oF CHL L Rms.
233,245 (1937) ; King, The Use of the Conon Counts it Califon:mia, 14 So. CALin. L R L.
288 (1941); Note, 30 CAUF. L. REV. 585 (1942); Note, 4 id. 352 (1916); Cuxx, CoD_
PLEA-INrG 287-96 (2d ed. 1947).
12. E.g., City of Logansport v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68,64 N.E. 595 (1902) ; Frosch v. Scars,
Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 300, 199 At. 646 (1938) ; Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc.,
283 N.Y. 299,28 N.E.2d 846 (1940). Other cases showing the unfortunate diversities of view,
even strange anomalies, which had developed under code pleading are collected in C.Awz,
CODE PLEADING 225-65, 287-311 (2d ed. 1947), and C.AMD, CAsEs oi: M.ozn: Pw.sa:;G
35-271 (1952).
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such as the often discussed Federal Rule 8(a), requiring the pleader to give
only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." It is shown more clearly in the federal Appendix of Forms,
supported by other provisions, such as Rule 8(e), permitting pleading alter-
nately, inconsistently, or hypothetically; Rule 12(b), the rule for taking ob-
jections in law, which tends to turn every such step into a motion for summary
judgment on the merits; Rule 15(b), the rule for recognizing amendments to
conform to the evidence; and indeed several other provisions pointing in the
same general direction.13 Of course, the system goes further than some wanted
or still accept ;14 but that it is no wild impractical idea is shown not only by its
very real success, but also by the serious criticism of able scholars that it does
not go far enough toward "notice pleading."'15 This rich vein of important and
necessary material is hardly tapped: there are only two or perhaps three relevant
cases, which do not meet head on ;16 and there are some references to critical
views, and some questions, so stated as to make the nature of conflicts-even
among critics and questioners-less apparent than the questions.1" Finally, the
13. Such as the pre-trial, depositions and discovery, and summary-judgment rules,
FE. R. Civ. P. 16, 26-37, 56, removing the emphasis from the pleadings and providing means
for quickly uncovering the merits.
14. The original objectors-still unreconciled, see note 6 supra-were Professor Mc-
Caskill, as in, e.g., Easy Pleading, 35 ILL. L Rav. 28 (1940), One Form of Civil Aclion,
But What Procedure, for the Federal Courts, 30 ILL. L. Riv. 415 (1935), and the article
cited note 18 infra; and Judge Fee, as in The Proposed New Rules for Uniform Procedure
in the Federal District Courts, 16 ORE. L. Rav. 103 (1937), The Lost Horiou in Pleadit
under the Federal Rules of Civiql Procedure, 48 COL. L. REv. 491 (1948), and Justice in
Search of a Handmaiden, 2 U. o FILA. L. Ray. 175 (1949). Approval of the rules has been
so general that it is hardly worth-while to attempt citations; a considerable number appear
in the reviewer's books as cited in note 12 supra.
15. See the noteworthy criticism in the most recent book and outstanding authority,
MIL.AR, CIvRI PROcEDURE OF THE TYuA CouR In HisrocAL Pmsva~cri 180-200 (1952).
See also Simpson, A Possible Solution of the Pleading Problen, 53 HARv. L. RFv. 169, 203
(1939). Although at times carelessly so designated, the federal rules are not an example of
"notice pleading," as the reviewer points out in CI.AaK, CODE PLEADING 240, 241 (2d ed.
1947).
16. The cases chiefly relied on are Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944),
an opinion by the reviewer, where the court refused to dismiss summarily on the pleadings
a claim against a collector of customs for lost goods, and Bush v. Skidis, 8 F.R.D. 561 (ED.
Mo. 1948), where the court granted a defendant's motion to make more definite and certain
a complaint following Federal Form 9, which is explicitly "sufficient" by the terms
of FED. R. Clv. P. 84. Whatever their opposing trends, the two cases are not directly anti-
thetic.
17. References at pp. 383, 384, to "Professor Simpson's criticisms" (see note 15 supra)
and "Dean Pound's four requirements for the pleadings, as quoted by Professor Blume"
(in Theory of Pleading-A Survey Including the Federal Rules, 47 Micn. L. R v. 297,
311-12 [1949]), with the admonition to "judge whether the pleadings under the federal
rules adequately fulfill these purposes," placed with other material supporting formal written
pleadings, tend to suggest deficiency, rather than excess, in the federal system.
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section ends with citation of an article by the most persistent critic of the newer
procedure as apparently the guide and mentor for all to follow.18
I conclude, from the evidence above briefly referred to and from some other
indications, that the distinguished editor, although generous in praise of the
federal civil and criminal rules generally, is, with respect to this aspect of
pleading, a critic and an opponent. 10 But this view is not made explicit, and I
suggest it with some hesitation because I do not wish to read beyond the lines
actually before us. This suggests an incidental point of casebook editing: Can
and should the editor keep his personal convictions out of his material? On
the whole I have concluded that he should not because he cannot, and that it is
much better to disclose enough for all-teachers, students, readers-to shoot at
than to leave the matter ambiguous. This volume seems to me an illustration
of the principle. Had so Olympian an authority shown a clear and direct criticism
of this important segment of modem pleading, it would have been provocative
of excellent discussion and debate and consequent increase of knowledge. And
there would have been available enough counterarguments to add proper fuel
to the controversy. (Incidentally, the editor is selective in the text authorities
he cites and approves; obviously he does not regard some prominent proce-
dural leaders as bringing enough to discussion, or possibly as "sound" enough,
18. McCaskill, The Modern Philosophy of Picading, 38 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952), which is
cited at p. 401 as "an excellent discussion of the functions to be served by the pleadings and
a summary of the opposing modem positions on these matters." The first is matter of
opinion; the second is surely true only in a Pick wickian sense.
19. The author was cited and quoted in the discussion at the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Conference, supra note 6; his opinion in Grobart v. Society for Establishing Useful Manu-
factures, 2 N.J. 136, 65 A.2d 833 (1949), is singled out for particular praise in McCaskill,
supra note 18. But the case is not, as there stated, one "reversing a judgment below because
of [a complaint's] inadequacy"; rather it vas affirmance of a judgment upon extensive
pleadings where, as against new allegations-a "departure"--in the reply, the court said
of the facts shown: "It is difficult to conceive of a clearer case of estoppel in pais." In view
of this decision on the merits, the pleading discussion may well be considered obiter. The
author's opinion contains a considerable and admirable historical discussion of the functions
of pleadings, leading to a curiously strict admonition against departure in the reply from
the original theory. Since the "theory of the pleadings" doctrine is gone, this, if so applied
hereafter, would seem a resurrection in a most unprofitable way of a common-law techni-
cality, merely to compel the polishing up of the complaint, rather than the reply. N.J. Rule
3:8-1 does contain a variation from FEn. R. Crv. P. 8(a) in that it requires "a statement of
the facts on which the claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," rather
than "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
There is nothing to indicate that this entails a difference in interpretation, though the neces-
sity of bringing cases to the "Chancery Division" or the "Law Division," NJ. Rule 3:40-2,
does result in technical formalities reminiscent of unmerged law and equity. See O'Neill
v. Vreeland, 6 N.J. 158, 77 .2d 899 (1951). Perhaps against this background, apotheosis
of the old would be not unexpected; at any rate, it appears to be found in Zabady v. Frame,
91 A-2d 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1952), where the majority rely on the Grobart case to repudiate
federal doctrine and hold an allegation, "On or about December 18, 1950," too indefinite,
over a vigorous dissent based on federal precedents.
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to be worthy of reference.20 ) As it is, this basic problem remains in so abbre-
viated and attenuated shape that the students are left in a haze as to the nature
of the problem, not to speak of the philosophy involved and its practical im-
plementation in day-to-day litigation.
As I have shown, my attitude toward the book is unfortunately ambivalent.
There is so much of good and interest and careful preparation in it that I
should like to join in its general acclaim. 2 ' So I do to a large extent. But I
cannot avoid some query as to whether it provides the intellectual exercise to
arouse the student's imagination and secure his permanent and abiding in-
terest. And I end with concern lest undue brevity in detail may stimulate
affirmative reactions with undesirable effects in the procedural field.
CHARLES E. CLARK4
RISKS AND RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES,
ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATER. By Samuel Spring. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1952. Pp. xviii, 385. $7.50.
IN the last issue of the JOURNAL, this reviewer discussed a book by
Alexander Lindey 1 having much in common with Mr. Spring's work. Both
books deal with the law protecting intellectual creations; both are intended
primarily for laymen rather than lawyers; both cite cases at the end of the
book to support points made in the respective chapters; both are by practicing
lawyers in the so-called entertainment branch of the law. The similarities,
however, end here.
Mr. Lindey's book is limited to a single branch of this broad field of law,
namely, plagiarism; Mr. Spring's work runs the whole gamut in its five
parts: Right of Privacy (31 pages) ; Defamation (34 pages) ; Copyright (155
pages, of which two chapters cover plagiarism-pp. 177-88; 213-28) ; Unfair
Competition (24 pages), and Television, Ideas, and Censorship (50 pages),
With so much to cover, Mr. Spring is forced to rush through his subjects
at a rate that leaves little room for an easy style on the one hand, or complete
legal analysis on the other. Yet many portions of the book are pro-
vocative and worth noting.
20. Thus citation of the writings of Professor J. W. Moore, except as they appear in
reported cases, is limited to a few inconsequential matters.
21. Murrah, Book Review, 38 A.B.AJ. 754 (1952); Medina, Judicial Administration
and the Law SchoolS, 40 Ky. L.J. 359 (1952) ; Winters, Book Review, 36 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y
61 (1952); Rooney, Book Review, 27 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 195 (1952); De Witt, Chiel
Jiustice Vanderbilt's "Cases and Materials on Modern Procedure and Judicial Adininistra-
tion," 7 THE REcoRD 450 (1952) ; Parker, Book Review, 5 J. LEGAL EDUC. 265 (1952).
tJudge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; formerly Dean, Yale Law
School.
1. PLAGIAISM AND ORIGINALITY (1952); see Review, 62 YALE L.J. 126 (1952).
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